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Vanishing Trials?: An English
Perspective
Robert Dingwall* and Emilie Cloatre**
This paper reviews the recent history of civil litigation in England and
Wales.1 While previous work by Professor Kritzer 2 has shown an absolute decline
in trials over the last fifty years, with some fluctuation around this trend, this
comment suggests that this may now have bottomed out. Given the evidence of a
simultaneous, and continuing, decline in the number of claims filed, it may even
be the case that trials are, at least temporarily, playing a larger part in the civil
justice system than they have for many years. In contrast to the experience in the
U.S., these changes seem to be intended and unintended consequences of deliber-
ate policy decisions by government and senior judges, which have changed the
options and incentives for other stakeholders. As such, it is important to be cau-
tious about the extent to which comparable trends in countries with comparable
common law jurisdictions have comparable explanations. In particular, we will
argue that the English experience should not be seen as a simple indicator of the
"Americanization" of English law or English litigation culture. Nevertheless,
Professor Galanter's concern for the wider social implications of a declining trial
rate also has relevance to the United Kingdom and its jurisdictions.
In his contribution to this volume, and in other recent papers,3 Galanter has
noted two trends in U.S. litigation: a slow, long-term decline over the last hundred
years or so in the proportion of cases tried in U.S. federal and state courts and a
steeper decline over the last thirty years in the absolute number of cases coming to
trial. He attributes the first of these to the failure of judicial ability to increase
supply in proportion to the increased volume of legal business. In effect, access is
rationed by delay and congestion, which increases the attractiveness of settlement
or abandonment of claims. However, the system's activist response to the conse-
quences of a diluted service by product innovation-case management and alter-
native forms of dispute resolution-has collided with other social and cultural
changes in the U.S. These include the relabelling of "access to justice" as a "liti-
gation explosion" with a view that excessive litigation is having an adverse effect
on society and the economy, a loss of confidence in the benevolence of govern-
ment and collective institutions, and a growing preference for private dispute reso-
* Robert Dingwall, Professor and Director, Institute for the Study of Genetics, Biorisks and Soci-
ety, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United Kingdom. We are most grateful to
Professor Bert Kritzer for his constructive and helpful comments on an earlier draft.
** Emilie Cloatre, ESRC Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute for the Study of Genetics, Biorisks and
Society, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United Kingdom.
1. The United Kingdom has three distinct jurisdictions for civil purposes: England and Wales;
Scotland; and Northern Ireland. Unless otherwise indicated, all data and interpretations presented in
this paper relate exclusively to the jurisdiction of England and Wales.
2. Herbert M. Kritzer, Disappearing Trials? A Comparative Perspective, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 735 (2004).
3. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal
and State Courts, 1 J. EMPRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
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lution (the resolution of conflicts in ways that are invisible to wider public scru-
tiny). He outlines five trajectories that the legal system might be following:
" Convergence with Mainland European practice, marginalizing trials
in favor of paper-based processes that accumulate a dossier of evi-
dence on which a decision can be made;
" Displacement of trials to court-like forums elsewhere;
" Assimilation of law into the culture and standard operating practices
of major organizations and institutions, suppressing the demand for
trials through the "legalization" of everyday practice;
" Transformation of the role of law within the governance of advanced
societies so that it merely supplies post hoc legitimacy to negotiated
outcomes based on the unconstrained use of power rather than pro-
moting a competing principle of power restrained by universalistic
ideals of justice;
Evolution, where law is the passive object of market actors seeking
an improved way to pursue their own interests.4
Galanter's overall conclusion is that the U.S. is increasingly becoming a soci-
ety permeated by law, but in ways that are unregulated by legal actors because of
the attrition in both the proportion of cases coming to trial and in the absolute
numbers of trials. He questions the extent to which this serves public, as opposed
to corporate, interests.
Kritzer has contributed a preliminary attempt to consider whether Galanter's
analysis is unique to American experience, or whether it can be generalized across
the common-law world.5 He examines civil and criminal trials in England and
Wales and civil trials in Ontario, Canada for varying periods from the late 1950s
until the year 2000. In general, he finds that civil trials have been declining.
However, in England at least, criminal trials have remained at a relatively stable
level in absolute terms, regardless of fluctuations in the crime rate and changes in
the jurisdictional boundaries of the courts.
Since this paper concentrates on civil litigation, we shall confine ourselves to
discussing that aspect of Kritzer's analysis. The difficulty that he faces is that,
although the statistical series remain reasonably consistent across the period, the
organizational structure of courts that they describe goes through three very sig-
nificant changes: in 1971, when a pattern of jurisdiction and court location estab-
lished in the 1870s was radically modified;6 in 1990, when the boundary between
the two tiers of civil courts--County, dealing with lower value cases, and High,
then dealing with cases worth over £5000 ($8,625)-was redrawn to direct more
4. Id. As Galanter outlines his sources, particularly in the work of Menkel-Meadow, the treatment
of evolution is not strictly Darwinian because of the way in which it contains notions of teleology,
movement towards "a better way." An evolutionary approach, in the classic sense, would not treat one
element as passive but would emphasise the co-evolution of law and markets, with each seeking to
adapt to the other within a particular historical context. This does not produce "a better way" in any
absolute sense, but merely a temporary and unstable equilibrium that represent the mutual fitness of
law and markets for that time and place. While Galanter's scenario will be evaluated in its own terms
later in this paper, these reservations should be kept in mind.
5. See generally Kritzer, supra note 2.
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business to the lower court; 7 and in 1999, when a package of reforms devised by
Lord Woolf, who later became Lord Chief Justice, was introduced to promote
judicial case management. 8 Cumulatively, these changes have tended to encour-
age litigants towards the 218 county courts, which have, over the same period,
also developed an extensive small claims jurisdiction. This now covers claims up
to £5000 ($8,625). The county court and the High Court may both hear all other
claims with one exception-claims may not begin in the High Court unless they
exceed £15,000 ($25,863) in money claims and £50,000 ($86,212) in personal
injury cases. The High Court, based in London and regional centers, is supposed
to hear cases that are more complex or require specialized judicial expertise; al-
though, in the light of the experience discussed below, the U.K. government is
now considering whether to promote a full merger of these overlapping jurisdic-
tions.9
Most of Kritzer's time series stop shortly after the implementation of the
Woolf reforms, which makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of the kind of
longer term change that Galanter explores from those of learning to deal with a
radically changed civil procedure. We have the advantage of a longer post-Woolf
time series and some of the evaluation work commissioned by the U.K. Depart-
ment of Constitutional Affairs (DCA) to document and interpret the effects of the
changes. I0 Dingwall also brings his "insider" experience as a former member
(1998-2001) of the Civil Justice Council (CJC), a body initially chaired by Lord
Woolf, and including representatives of all the major stakeholders, set up to moni-
tor the effects of the reform package." We look first at the available statistical
data and then consider how this may be understood in terms of both the intended
and unintended consequences of the reforms as a means of testing the generaliza-
bility of Galanter's proposed explanations.
7. REPORT OF THE REvIEw BODY ON CIVIL JUSTICE, 1988, Cm. 394; Courts and Legal Services
Act, 1990, c.22 (Eng.).
8. ACCESS TO JUSTICE: INTERIM REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE
SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1995), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/interfr.htm (last
visited Mar. 15, 2006); ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL
JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1996), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/
contents.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006); R. CIV. PRO. 1998, c.12 (Eng.).
9. A Single Civil Court?: The scope for unifying the civil jurisdictions of the High Court, the
county courts and the Family Proceedings Courts, DCA Consultation Paper, CP 06/05 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/civilcourt/civilcourtcp0605.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
10. The government department responsible for policy relating to the legal system was known as the
Lord Chancellor's Department until 2003. The DCA's mission is somewhat different from that of its
predecessor and a number of key functions have been hived off to various agencies, particularly Her
Majesty's Courts Service, which actually administers the courts, with responsibility for support staff,
premises, etc. See Department for Constitutional Affairs, Departmental Overview, available at
http://www.dca.gov.uk (last visited Feb. 20, 2006); Her Majesty's Court Service, About HMCS, avail-
able at http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
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I. RECENT TRENDS IN CIVIL JUSTICE CLAIMS AND TRIALS IN ENGLAND
AND WALES
This section presents data on the number of claims and trials in the High
Court (Queen's Bench division) and the County Courts from the mid-1990s until
2004, the latest year available. This data is derived from the annual DCA reports,
available online since 1998,12 and two DCA reports specifically evaluating the
effect of the Woolf reforms. 13
A. High Court (Queen's Bench division)
The Queen's Bench division of the High Court is competent mainly for
higher value cases in contract or tort. Kritzer presents data from 1960 to 1998
showing a substantial long-term decline in the number of trials.14 As Figure 1
shows, allowing for a degree of turbulence around the time of the Woolf reforms,
both the number of cases set down and the number decided at trial seem to have
been slowly declining since 1998. As Kritzer notes, changes in the method of data
collection have now made it impossible to determine how many trials actually
commence.1 5 However, the series dealing with setting down a case (asking for a
trial date to be allocated), and with completed trials, remain consistent. The first
is a reasonable indicator of the willingness in principle of the parties to go to trial,
even if they actually expect to settle en route, and the second gives some indica-
tion of the volume of trial business, even if it is an imperfect proxy for the alloca-
tion of judicial time.' 6 However, this data probably underestimates the decline in
demand faced by this court. The relationship between the number of cases set
down and the number of trials actually held in a given time period is not just a
function of settlement rates but also of the degree of congestion-the waiting time
from filing to trial.
12. For the data from 1998 to 2004, available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/jsarlist.htm (last visited Feb.
20, 2006).
13. DEPARTMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, EMERGING FINDINGS: AN EARLY EvALUATION
OF THE CIvIL JUSTICE REFORMS (2001), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/civillemerge/emerge.htm
(last visited Feb. 20, 2006); DEPARTMENT FOR CONSTITUTtONAL AFFAIRS, FURTHER FINDINGS: A
CONTINUING EVALUATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORMS (2002), available at
http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/reform/ffreform.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
14. Kritzer, supra note 2, at 739.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 741. In a personal communication to the authors, Kritzer has also shown that the trends in
trial starts and trial completions track each other quite closely (trials may start and not be completed
for various reasons such as the parties agreeing to settle or the plaintiff realizing the case is unsustain-
able and withdrawing their claim.
[Vol. 2006
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Figure 1
Queen's Bench Division: Time from Setting Down to Disposition 1998-200418
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Figure 2
Figure 2 shows that the waiting time has decreased sharply so the number of
trials is only being maintained at its current level by pulling forward cases that
would otherwise be heard at a later date. Assuming that there is some minimum
level of delay that is functional for the system-in terms of ensuring judicial time
is efficiently deployed and the parties have sufficient notice to ensure that their
paperwork is in order and their witnesses are available-this volume of business is
ultimately unsustainable. It is like an old-fashioned problem in high school arith-
17. Figure 1, compiled by authors from DCA Judicial Statistics Annual Reports, 1998-2004. DE-
PARTMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, JUDICIAL STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT (Eng.), available
at http://www.dca.gov.uk/jsarlist.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
18. Figure 2, compiled by authors from DCA Judicial Statistics Annual Reports, 1998-2004. DE-
PARTMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, JUDICIAL STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT (Eng.), available
at http://www.dca.gov.uk/jsarlist.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
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metic: where one pipe is filling a water tank slowly, while another drains it rap-
idly, the tank will eventually be empty.
This conclusion is reinforced by an analysis of the trends in claims filed with
this court-remember that trials can only take place on the basis of what is filed.
Figure 3 is taken from the DCA's 2002 evaluation report and shows a clear rup-
ture in the number of claims before and after the introduction of the Woolf re-
forms in April 1999.
Number of claims in the Queen's Bench Division from January 1997 to November
200119
- T~E. m dat~11rft.z111 I k~ 1k PPH9- 6 mok l er.
Figure 3
The graph requires some care in interpretation because it covers a relatively
short time period. The rise prior to April 1999 may be explicable as an attempt by
lawyers to press cases into the system before the rules changed and some of the
subsequent drop may simply reflect such bunching. However, one would expect
the trend to begin to turn upwards again as lawyers gained more experience with
the new system. Figure 4 shows clearly that this is not the case. There has been a
sharp continuous reduction in the number of cases brought to the High Court since
1999.
19. Figure 3, DEPARTMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, FURTHER FINDINGS: A CONTINUING
EVALUATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORMS (2002), available at
http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/reform/ffreform.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
[Vol. 2006
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Queen's Bench Division: Claims issued 1995-20042"
_0
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1yCnr Office by Dlstrict Registries
Figure 4
It can be somewhat misleading to concentrate exclusively on absolute num-
bers rather than looking at rates, which correct for possible changes in the popula-
tion of events that generate these data. There is an obvious problem with claims
in that we do not know what relationship they bear to claimable events. However,
if we consider the relationship between claims and trials, we find that there is
about one trial for every thirty-five claims in 1998 and one trial for every eight
claims in 2004 .2 ' This would be consistent with the notion of trials being pulled
forward to sustain a given level of activity, but it also raises the question of
whether we are looking more at an issue of vanishing claims than of vanishing
trials.
Before considering whether these figures have any wider significance, it is
important to rule out any factors that might be specific to the situation of the High
Court. In particular, as noted above, a series of system reforms over the last thirty
years have been designed to shift business away from this court to the County
Courts. We might, then, expect to see an increase in case volume in the lower
courts such that the decline in High Court business is simply an indication of the
20. Figure 4, DEPARTMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, JUDICIAL STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT,
2004, available at http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm65/6565/6565.pdf. (last visited
Feb.20, 2006).
21. This is a very crude indicator, since the lags in the system mean that claims filed in any given
year would not be set down for trial until at least 18-24 months later. Strictly speaking, the number of
cases set down for trial in any year should be expressed as a function of the number of claims filed
approximately two years earlier. Given the upheavals of 1998-2000, and the evidence of changing
speed of movement through the system, this would be difficult to do in any fashion that would lead to a
convincing time series. The figures presented here are better seen as orders of magnitude that are
indicative of a trend and consistent with other data rather than as bearing a great deal of evidentiary
weight in their own right.
No. 1]
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success of policy-makers in diverting lower-value cases to a cheaper forum staffed
by judges with less experience or more limited skills.
B. County Courts
The County Courts in England and Wales deal with the majority of civil liti-
gation (contract, tort, recovery of land, some equity cases), including small-claim
procedures, which now constitute the majority of cases dealt with in the County
Courts. Once again, Kritzer provides data on the trends in the County Courts up to
2003, which show a steady decline in the number of trials since the 1960s. 22 ini-
tially, this can be explained by the introduction of the small claims procedure, but
hearings under this process have also been in decline since the mid-1990s. Figure
5 shows that this pattern has continued through to 2004, although there has been a
slight post-Woolf increase in the number of County Court trials (from 15,167 to
15,734) between 2003 and 2004, possibly representing some shift of business
from the High Court now that parties have the option of being heard in either fo-
rum for higher-value cases.
23











-4-Trials ---- Small claims hearings
Figure 5
Turning again to look at how this relates to the experience of claim filing, we
can see that this has also been declining. Figure 6 shows the DCA data for the
total number of claims filed over the immediate period of the implementation of
the Woolf reforms.
22. Kritzer, supra note 2, at 746.
23. Compiled from DCA, Judicial Statistics Annual Reports 2003 and 2004. DEPARTMENT FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, JUDICIAL STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT (Eng.), available at
http://www.dca.gov.uk/jsarlist.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
24. Figure 5, compiled by authors from DCA Judicial Statistics Annual Reports, 1998-2004.
DEPARTMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, JUDICIAL STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT (Eng.), avail-
able at http://www.dca.gov.uk/jsarlist.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
[Vol. 2006
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Number of claims in the County Courts from January 1997 to November 200125
Figure 6
Different types of claims showed slightly different patterns, but the overall
picture is remarkably consistent. Claim volumes were rising up to April 1999 but
have since been gently declining. Figure 7 shows the longer-term picture for
County Court claims.







-- Total Claims Year
Figure 7
It is difficult to repeat the estimates about changing relationships between
trial and hearing numbers and claims because of the great diversity of County
25. Figure 6, DEPARTMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, FURTHER FINDINGS: A CONTINUING
EVALUATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORMS (2002), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/jsarlist.htm
(last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
26. Figure 7, compiled by authors from DCA Judicial Statistics Annual Reports, 1998-2004. DE-
PARTMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, JUDICIAL STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT (Eng.), available
at http://www.dca.gov.uk/jsarlist.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
No. 1]
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Court business and the number of simple debt claims that will be handled admin-
istratively without a trial ever being contemplated. However, if we take the crude
data on claims filed, and trials and hearings conducted, we find that there is
roughly one hearing for every 20 claims in 1998 and one for every 25 claims in
2004.
C. Interpreting Recent Trends
If we consider these data together, it is clear that there is some evidence of a
transfer of business from the High Court to the County Courts; overall though, the
numbers of civil trials in England and Wales are, at best, flatlining at levels well
below those of the 1970s and 1980s examined by Kritzer, as illustrated by com-
bining the data from Figure 1 and Figure 5, in Figure 8.











- Small claims hearings
--- High Court cases set down for trial
Figure 8
However, it is not clear that this reflects a reluctance to try cases so much as a
reluctance to file claims. Figure 9 shows the DCA's own assessment of the period
around the implementation of the Woolf reforms.
27. Figure 8, compiled by authors from DCA Judicial Statistics Annual Reports, 1998-2004. DE-
PARTMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, JUDICIAL STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT (Eng.), available
at http://www.dca.gov.uk/jsarlist.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
[Vol. 2006
10
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2006, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2006/iss1/7
An English Perspective
Number of Claims in the High Court, Queen's Bench Division and the County
Courts, January 1997 to November 200128
54~~~ j -1 - e ;
~ T~~d 1 T ~ Is I~ 4I
Figure 9
We have compiled Figure 10 on the same basis. Although there is a very
slight turn upwards in 2004, with about 1.5 percent more claims filed than in
2003, it is not yet clear that this has any real significance, or if it is simply a ran-
dom fluctuation.










28. Figure 9, DEPARTMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, FURTHER FINDINGS: A CONTINUING
EVALUATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORMS (2002), available at
http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/reform/ffreform.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
29. Figure 10, compiled by authors from DCA Judicial Statistics Annual Reports, 1998-2004.
DEPARTMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, JUDICIAL STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT (Eng.), avail-
able at http://www.dca.gov.uk/jsar/list.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
No. 1]
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The most plausible interpretation of these data is that the number of civil tri-
als may actually have bottomed out in England and Wales, or even increased
somewhat relative to the number of claims being filed. Taking our data together
with those presented by Kritzer, it is clear that the number of trials is at a histori-
cally low level, but that this is associated with other evidence of the avoidance of
litigation more generally. It is more probable that courts are not being brought
cases to try rather than the courts are simply trying fewer cases.
II. THE WOOLF REFORMS: INTENDED AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
In order to understand this apparent avoidance of litigation, it is important to
look at the recent organizational reforms, and their avowed aims of diverting cases
from court. Lord Woolf, one of the most senior judges in England, and later the
Lord Chief Justice, was asked in 1994 to review the rules and procedures of the
civil courts in England and Wales. He published an Interim Report in 1995 and a
Final Report in the following year, proposing changes in rules and procedure that
were published in 1998 and came into effect April 1, 1999."0 The Woolf inquiry
was the Conservative government's second attempt to reform the civil justice
system following the perceived failure of the Civil Justice Review of 1988.31 In
the first chapter of the Interim Report, Woolf laid out his fundamental principles.32
In his view, the public provision of a civil justice system was one of the hallmarks
of a civilized society. 3p "The law itself provides the basic structure within which
commerce and industry operate. It safeguards the rights of individuals, regulates
their dealings with others and enforces the duties of government." 34
However, the system was compromised by lack of access, which denied citi-
zens, whether individual or corporate, remedies for breaches of their rights or
failures in others' duties. An accessible system should aim to be the following:
just; fair; proportionate in the relationship between costs and issues; reasonably
speedy; understandable to users; responsive to users; certain; and effective. These
aims were compromised by: an adversarial environment; the expense of litiga-
tion-both in terms of excessive absolute costs and disproportion between costs
and the value of claims; uncertainty about costs; internationally uncompetitive
costs; delay-in progressing cases, settling cases and hearing cases; complexity of
procedure; limited availability of legal assistance; and low legal system priority,
relative to criminal and family business. The remedy would be a set of procedural
reforms that explicitly introduced judicial case management to the U.K..
30. See supra note 8.
31. See supra note 7.
32. LORD HARRY WOOLF, DEPARTMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, INTERIM REPORT TO THE
LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES, June 1995 (Eng.),
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Woolf s Final Report set out the author's vision of a "new landscape" for
civil justice. This would have the following features:
" Litigation to be avoided wherever possible-mainly by encouraging
greater use of ADR and pre-action protocols, standardized sets of
documents describing the claim and the relevant evidence;
" Litigation to be less adversarial and more cooperative-through
stronger judicial censure and penalties on aggressive, partisan or un-
cooperative behavior by lawyers or expert witnesses;
" Litigation to be less complex-with a single set of rules for High
Court and County Courts, a simplified set of documents and penal-
ties for the tactical abuse of rules or documents;
" The timescale of litigation to be shorter and more certain-courts
would take over control of the scheduling and of the issues to be
tried;
" The cost of litigation to be more affordable, more predictable, and
more proportionate to the value and complexity of individual
cases-most cases to be covered by fixed fees or court-determined
guidelines;
" Parties of limited financial means to be able to conduct litigation on
a more equal footing-by increased access to advice services and by
court intervention to prevent richer parties using their wealth to skew
the system;
" Clear lines of judicial and administrative responsibility-designated
judges would manage provision locally and nationally;
" Court structure and judicial deployment of judges designed to meet
the needs of litigants--cases distributed according to their complex-
ity, appeals to be more straightforward and electronic communica-
tion to be improved;
" Judges to be deployed effectively so they can manage litigation in
accordance with the new rules and protocols-additional training in
case management and enhanced administrative and technological
support;
" Responsive to the needs of litigants-through better advice, informa-
tion and monitoring.
35
Within this context, it should be clear that the recent decline of trials in Eng-
land is in no sense an inadvertent or unintended event. Although the Woolf re-
forms were launched on the back of a falling trend in the number of trials, their
supporters would argue that a decline driven by access barriers has been replaced
by a decline driven by more efficient and effective case management. The decline
in trials is an indicator of a system that is performing well because disputes are
being resolved elsewhere at less cost and with readier access. However, this is not
so easy to reconcile with the evidence of the parallel decline in claims and the
questions that have more recently emerged about whether England now has
35. LORD HARRY WOOLF, DEPARTMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, FINAL REPORT TO THE
LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES, July 1996 (Eng.), avail-
able at http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/index.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
No. 1]
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enough litigation to supply a framework of certainty in case negotiations. Is low-
ering barriers really increasing access?
Re-reading Woolf's reports, it is not clear to what extent he envisaged claim-
ing "going underground." His model appears to assume that claims will come
forward at pretty much the same rate as always, if not at a rate increased by re-
duced barriers of cost and delay, but that they will settle more easily as a result of
active case management, including early diversion to ADR, and better documenta-
tion. Trials will only occur in cases that have been filtered by judicial officers
who have determined that there is indeed a triable dispute over law or facts. There
is no indication that the volume of trials is expected to decline absolutely, al-
though it may decline proportionately, if claim volumes increase.
In their comments on the Interim Report, Dingwall and Durkin pointed out
that, if you ask a judge to write a report, you are likely to end up with a judge-
centered analysis rather than a systemic one. 36 Woolf s approach places the court
at the center of the civil justice system, while most law and society scholars would
place it somewhere at the margin. It is the small part of the iceberg that is visible,
while the processes of bargaining and negotiation continue below the waterline, or
in the shadows as Mnookin and Kornhauser have it.37 We must be careful not to
assume that civil justice is achieved only by what happens in courts and trials,
rather than in the process of settlement negotiation as lawyers work with the bar-
gaining endowments that the system assigns to them. As Dingwall and Durkin
pointed out, the changes in the court process and the expanded role of the judges
change the incentives for other participants. In particular, they noted the well-
documented preference of lawyers for avoiding trial in most types of civil litiga-
tion. 38 This preference is because of the way in which judges introduce uncer-
tainty and remove control of the process from the parties, which would be allied to
a procedure that required expensive work up front rather than at the approach of
trial. 39 Dingwall and Durkin noted that lawyers tended to get claims in, not work
them very actively until a trial date approached and then pull the evidence to-
gether and look to settle. 40 The introduction of pre-action protocols means that the
case preparation now has to be done before a claim is filed. But if the case has to
be fully documented at the outset, why would parties who were used to playing
against each other bother to file a claim at all? Why not just exchange the papers
and enter settlement discussions in much the same way as ever? In this way, the
parties or, perhaps more precisely, their lawyers, retain control of the case and its
processing. This also seems to apply to ADR. An example of this is the way the
Department of Health's attempt to introduce mediation in medical negligence
claims was undermined by the tendency of parties to settle prior to the scheduled
hearing.4'
36. Robert Dingwall & Tom Durkin, Time Management and Procedural Reform: Some Organiza-
tional Questions for Lord Woolf, in REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON 'ACCESS TO JUSTICE'
371, 390 (A.A.S Zuckerman & Ross Cranston eds. 1995).
37. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950 (1979).
38. Dingwall & Durkin, supra note 36, at 387.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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In practice there seems to be considerable enthusiasm for avoidance. Pre-
action protocols, in particular, are popular with litigators, who see them as a valu-
able device for assessing cases on the basis of standardized information and
achieving early settlement. This has not had much impact on lawyers' costs-
because cases are now simply front-loaded rather than end-loaded by late settle-
ment and trial.42 However, it has had a major impact on court income. Having
prepared a pre-action protocol, one way to cut costs is to avoid filing a claim and
paying the associated fees, if settlement seems possible or the evidentiary base
evaporates.
The creation of early settlement opportunities by the Woolf reforms coincides
with two other important changes in the courts' environment-the switch from
public legal aid to contingency-style funding of civil litigation and the planned
elimination of public subsidy for the civil courts.
England does not have a pure contingency fee system in the sense that suc-
cessful lawyers take an agreed percentage of whatever sums they recover for cli-
ents. Instead, since 1995, lawyers have been allowed to make "no win, no fee"
arrangements with clients, where costs are still based on hours worked and sums
actually disbursed, subject to court checks. Initially, lawyers were allowed to add
a "success fee," normally about 25 percent of the recovery, which was supposed
to cover their expenditure on the cases they lost. However, since 2000, the loser
has normally paid the success fee, in addition to the agreed sums in recovery or
costs. Individual litigants bringing a claim under conditional fee arrangements are
generally advised to purchase insurance against the risk of loss, since they remain
liable for the defendants' costs even if they are not billed by their own lawyer. The
insurance premium is also recoverable from the defendant if the case succeeds.
Criminal and family cases are excluded from these arrangements but all other civil
cases have been included since 1998. 43 Conditional arrangements have effectively
replaced the means-tested public legal aid that used to be available for civil litiga-
tion. In the year ending March 31, 2005, the Legal Services Commission spent
approximately twice as much funding criminal work as civil, and much of what is
described as "civil" work actually refers to advice services for socially excluded
groups on their particular legal problems and an element of support for family law
cases rather than, for example, personal injury litigation. Lawyers in private prac-
tice are playing a decreasing role in this provision compared with not-for-profit
advice agencies employing mainly lay staff.44
42. See supra note 13. John Peysner & Mary Seneviratne, DCA Research Series 9/2005: The Man-
agement of Civil Cases: The Courts and the Post-Woolf Landscape, Department for Constitutional
Affairs (Nov. 2005) (Eng.), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/research/2005/9_2005_full.pdf (last
visited Feb. 20, 2006).
43. Simplifying CFAs: A Consultation on the Conditional Fee Agreement Regime Including the:
Conditional Fee Agreements, Collective Conditional Fee Agreements, Membership Organization
Regulations, Department for Constitutional Affairs (June 2003) (Eng.), available at
http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/confees/cfa.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006); Paul Fenn et al., The
Impact of Conditional Fees on the Selection, Handling and Outcomes of Personal Injury Cases, De-
partment for Constitutional Affairs (2002) (Eng.), available at
http://www.dca.gov.uk./research/2002/6-02es.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
44. LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-05 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/docs/about us-main/AR05.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
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As yet, there is no firm evidence of the implications of conditional fees for
access. It is unlikely to create the same disincentives to take on low value cases as
in the U.S., because lawyers can continue to charge "reasonable costs" rather than
relying on achieving an award sufficiently large for these to be covered by their
percentage. However, the Woolf approach of encouraging courts to regulate costs
roughly in proportion to the size of awards may have a similar effect.
The implications of the withdrawal of public funding for court costs have
been more controversial, and the subject of sharp exchanges between Lord Woolf
and government ministers. Lord Woolf s position was expressed most clearly in a
speech made at the Annual Judges Dinner, on July 17, 2002:45
I hope, but it is too early to be satisfied, that the public expenditure
review offers some comfort so far as criminal justice is concerned. I am
afraid, so far as civil and family justice is concerned, the position is
otherwise. I recognize that the huge demands across the public service
mean that the government must set priorities and all that I can ask is that
the needs of the other aspects of justice besides the criminal are properly
considered. Unfortunately, during current and previous reviews this has
not happened as a result of a flawed approach on the part of the Treasury.
The Treasury's approach is based on the misconception that it is possible
for the courts to provide the public with justice on a full cost recovery
basis-that is for the cost to the courts of dealing with particular types of
cases to be covered in full by the fees paid by the parties. The corollary
of this is that no more should be spent on providing a system of civil
justice than can be recovered from the litigants as court fees. I would
have thought the policy is self evidently nonsense. Yet this policy was
adopted in 1992 without Parliamentary scrutiny and has continued since,
not withstanding the protests of the judiciary. No other country of which
I am aware has such a policy and when I mention it to colleagues abroad
they are astonished. Its effects are Ternicious and serious and mean that
the funding review has been unfair.
Essentially, successive U.K. governments have decided that, although civil
justice may be a public service, it is not a public good in the sense that Lord
Woolf asserted in his first report.47 Although, as Lord Woolf notes, governments
have been reluctant to defend the policy in public, their communications with the
Civil Justice Council made it clear that they see the system as providing only pri-
vate benefits for individuals rather than collective benefits for the society as a
whole.48 Again, Lord Woolf has articulated a contrary view, which can be found
in the decision of the Court of Appeals in Heil v. Rankin.49
45. Available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications-media/speeches/pre_2004/lcjl70702.htm
(last visited June 6, 2006).
46. Id.
47. See supra note 20.
48. Supra note 44.
49. Heil v. Rankin (2001) Q.B. 272 (2;23), 294.
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The assessment (of damages) requires the judge to make a value judg-
ment. That value judgment has been increasingly constrained by the de-
sire to achieve consistency between the decisions of different judges.
Consistency is important, because it assists in achieving justice between
one claimant and another and one defendant and another. It also assists to
achieve justice by facilitating settlements. The courts have become in-
creasingly aware that this is in the interest of litigants and society as a
whole.
50
The creation of precedents and the creation of law, through the civil justice
system, is not perceived by government as contributing to the general welfare in
the same way as state-provided education or health care. 51 Following the logic of
this reasoning, successive U.K. governments have, since the early 1980s, deter-
mined that the full costs of providing a civil justice system should be met by its
users through court fees.52 Initially, fees were set to cover the costs of court ac-
commodation and support staff only, 53 but in 1992 were extended to include the
cost of judicial salaries. 54 This policy appears to be unique among major devel-
oped countries, including the rest of Europe and the U.S..55 It has been criticised
by major stakeholders,56 particularly for the lack of debate and transparency that
has accompanied its introduction and development.57 However, civil justice fi-
nancing is not a matter that attracts wide political or public interest and the con-
troversy has been contained within a fairly narrow policy community.
Some of the difficulties can be illustrated if we examine the accommodation
charges. These are levied as a charge reflecting the imputed capital value of court
buildings and the return that would be generated by renting them in the local mar-
ket for commercial property. While this is a reasonable principle in encouraging
public sector institutions to review their use of space and manage this with maxi-
mum efficiency, it has perverse effects in relation to buildings that are special
purpose and may well have historic features that make them costly to maintain.
The High Court's main base, the Royal Courts of Justice, for example, occupies a
50. Id.
51. VICKI CHAPMAN & DISTRICT JUDGE CARLOS DABEZIES, CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, FULL COST
RECOVERY: A PAPER BY THE FEES SUB-CoMMrrtEE, 2002 (Eng.), available at
http://www.civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk/files/Ful-Costs-Recovery-v1.3_Draft-toCJC.pdf. (last visited
Feb. 20,2006); LAw SOCIETY OF ENGLAND, CIVIL AND FAMILY COURT FEE INCREASES: LAW SOCIETY
RESPONSE TO THE HM COURT SERVICE CONSULTATION, Nov. 18, 2005 (Eng.), available at
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/secure/file/l148417/d:/teamsitedeployed/documents//template
data/intemet%20Documents/nongovemment%20proposals/Documents/courtfeesincreaseresponse 1811
05.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
52. Until the beginning of 2006, family matters were an exception, with the government contributing
about 30 percent of the costs from general tax revenues. Subsidy is now concentrated on individuals
through discretionary fee remissions or the residue of the civil legal aid scheme.
53. The Government's Expenditure Plans, 1983-84 to 1985-86 (Vol. 2, p. 42). For Comments, see
Chapman, supra note 51, at 2. For earlier governmental decisions maintaining accommodation and
salaries as part of government funding, see the REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER COURT
FEES, 1923, Cmd. 1856.
54. The Civil Justice Council highlights the lack of clarity with regard to the official adoption of this
decision. See Chapman, supra note 51.
55. Id. at 13.
56. Id. at 2.
57. Id. at 5.
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prime site in the center of London. This has a high value, reflected in the capital
charge, although the historic nature of the building means that this is unlikely ever
to be realizable. The historic construction also leads to particularly high operating
and maintenance costs.
58
In a rational economic world, the court would relocate to an anonymous of-
fice block in a less central location, in response to market signals about its cost
base. In the real world, such a relocation is ruled out by other policy considera-
tions about the preservation and use of historic buildings. However, the costs of
these policy constraints are born by court users rather than by general taxation.
As a result, court fees have been rising steadily across the system since the late
1980s. The volume of business at the Royal Courts of Justice is not sufficient to
sustain the full costs of this location, and discriminatory pricing would simply
drive more cases into the county court, generating a vicious circle of declining
workloads and rising fees, so this places a significant additional charge (£20 mil-
lion/ $34.5 million) on all users. Although attempts have been made to generate
some cross-subsidy,59 the demand for trial is perceived as price-sensitive-there is
anecdotal evidence of insurers agreeing to artificially low figures for disputes so
that matters of fact or law can be tried cheaply and then used to resolve the real,
and much higher, value of the claims. Consequently, fees have come to make up a
relatively high proportion of recoveries, particularly for small claims. In 2002, the
Civil Justice Council estimated that the issue fee alone represented about 27 per-
cent of claims for £100, and 10.7 percent of a £750 claim.60 Consequently, there
has been a growing concern about the extent to which litigants are being priced
out of the courts.6'
III. THE TRAJECTORY OF THE ENGLISH CIVIL COURTS
As in the U.S., there have been attempts to argue that the U.K. has seen the
development of a "compensation culture" and a "litigation explosion." 62 Although
there has been less systematic research on these issues than in the U.S., the data
presented in this paper and elsewhere does not suggest that these arguments have
58. See Lord Justice Mance, Is Civil Justice a Poor Relation? The Royal Courts of Justice-Loss
Leader or Bankrupt Building?, Speech to the London Solicitor's Litigation Association Conference,
Oct. 30, 2003, (Eng.), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/judicial/speeches/ljm30l003.htm (last
visited Feb. 20, 2006) (commenting on the issues raised by the use of the Royal Courts of Justice and
their cost).
59. For details, see Chapman, supra note 51.
60. Id.
61. This risk is highlighted in response to a consultation on court fees. See DEPARTMENT FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CIVIL COURT FEES (Eng.), available at
http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/civilcourt/srl005.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). Currently, the main
answer that the government has provided in that respect has been to offer exemption or remission of
court fees, although this is not currently perceived as sufficient to limit the potentially negative effects
that increase of court fees can have on access to justice.
62. Jonathan Broughton, et al., The Cost of Compensation Culture, Institute of Actuaries (2002)
(Eng.), available at http://www.actuaries.org.uk/files/pdf/giro2002/lowe.pdf (last visited Feb. 20,
2006) (discussing "compensation culture"). This claim is criticized by, for example, the Better Routes
to Redress, Better Regulation Task Force (2004) (Eng.), available at
http://www.brc.gov.uk/downloads/pdf/betterroutes.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). FRANK FUREDI,
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any stronger basis in fact. Litigation has been declining fairly steadily in recent
years, although, in contrast to Galanter, we would place more evidence on the
degree to which the decline in trials has been driven by a decline in claims filed.
It is, of course, possible that the decline in claim filings is the result of the devel-
opment of pre-action protocols since 1999 and the growth of settlement before
filing but additional data on, for example, the relationship between claims notified
to liability insurers and claims filed with courts would be needed to test this. For
the present, we can agree with Galanter that there seems to be firm evidence of a
tendency to avoid bringing civil matters to the courts for resolution.
Unlike the U.S., however, this is a deliberate act of state policy as much as
the unintended aggregate consequence of private decision making. It is probably
fair to say that avoidance has gone further than state actors might have envisaged
because of their failure to understand some of the implications of changing the
balance of incentives in the system. This includes the possible emergence of dif-
ficulties in settlement negotiation because of a lack of precedents to define bar-
gaining endowments. The encouragement of avoidance stems from the declining
acceptance among policymakers that civil justice is a public good so much as a
service provided by the state to facilitate the pursuit of private interests. Citizens
may be advised or guided in this pursuit by state-funded agencies but will rarely
receive direct financial aid for doing so. Civil justice is a resource that allows
self-reliant citizens to mobilize the state in support of their justified claims, but
entirely at their own expense and secondary to their perceptions of the costs and
benefits of doing so. 63 The dilution of court engagement by case management
simply seems to have replaced the declining number of small claims hearings in
the workload of lower-level judicial officers. ADR has had a negligible impact,
except in stimulating early settlement to avoid it.
If we turn to Galanter's five trajectories, the situation in England seems to be
as follows:
" Convergence: There is a growth of paper-based processes in the
form of the pre-action protocols and the dossiers that these gener-
ate-but these seem to be replacing court involvement more gener-
ally rather than becoming a basis for judicial decisions.
" Displacement: Most of the growth of court-like forums in the U.K.
has been linked to the rise of the welfare state and its systems of so-
cial security and social protection. This process was mostly com-
plete by 1980 and there have been relatively few new tribunals es-
tablished since that time. There has been some significant growth of
private arbitration fora, in relation to credit cards or travel agents'
services, for example, but little is known about the operation of these
schemes.
" Assimilation: There have been fewer studies in the U.K. about this,
but may well be significant, particularly in relation to the moral
panic about the perceived growth of a compensation culture. Most
large organizations, whether public or private have, for example,
63. There is an interesting paradox in that the U.S. tends to ration access to health care by price and
access to justice by congestion, while the U.K. rations access to health care by congestion and now
access to justice by price.
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dealt with the increasing volume of anti-discrimination legislation by
setting up internal compliance units and incorporating legal stan-
dards into standard operating procedures for managers and supervi-
sors.
" Transformation: This has also received fewer studies in the U.K., al-
though the distribution of incentives within the civil justice system
and the growth of human rights litigation may have checked this to a
greater extent than in the U.S.. Care needs to be taken to ensure that
law as the outcome of a legitimate political process that reconciles
the interests of diverse stakeholders is not confused with law as the
legitimation of a perverted political process where the powerful
stakeholders oppress the weaker ones.
" Evolution: This seems closer to the present situation in England,
where the state is tending to withdraw and leave civil justice to the
market. At most, the state's role is that of aiding the disadvantaged
into that market to act on their own behalf rather than acting as a
proxy for them.
In the absence of a degree of separation of powers comparable to that in the
U.S., civil justice has always been a legitimate object of state policy. However,
the reconceptualisation of the state's role that has occurred in the U.K. since 1979
has led to a progressive dilution of the state's interest in this, and in other areas.
To the extent that access to justice is a dimension of public welfare, a marker of a
civilised society in Lord Woolf's terms, the government is less concerned to pro-
vide this than to facilitate citizens in mobilizing it on their own behalf. As such,
the system is vulnerable to desertion if citizens find other ways of dealing with
their claims, grievances or disputes. The result may be to favor corporate interests
in some cases, but it may be to favor individuals in others, if corporate parties
consider that the costs of resisting small personal claims exceed those of settling
with modest payments.
Although the statistical series suggest that the trends in the U.K. and the U.S.
run in parallel, we should be wary of assuming that the causation is identical.
Galanter's scenarios are not mutually exclusive and one might observe similar
outcomes from quite different mixtures in different environments.
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